In Part 1, I debunked the myths around the 1500-hour rule. Here in Part 2, I examine why this rule still matters: what experience truly brings to safety, judgment, and operational resilience.

Why The 1500-Hour Rule Is Worth Defending

So, since there are no studies that show the 1500-hour rule has made aviation safer, why do I think it’s a good idea? I think as an airline passenger you have the right to expect the pilots in charge of your safety aren’t only qualified but, possess a requisite minimum of experience as well. The difference between 250 and 1500 hours in terms of aeronautical knowledge and experience is huge.

There is so much learning that goes on during that time and I don’t think the right place to learn is in the cockpit of an airliner with paying customers behind you. The right seat of an airliner is also a terrible place to develop flying skills. Automation dependency is a real problem in the industry and it’s much worse when the pilot doesn’t have a solid foundation of hand-flying skills to start with. While there may not be a study that correlates a 1500 hour minimum with an increase in safety, that’s not the same thing as saying there isn’t any evidence that argues for an increase in experience.

Lessons From Ethiopian 302

A prime example is found in Ethiopian 302 the Ethiopian 737 MAX crash. That first officer had only 361 hours of total time of which 207 were in the 737. Which means, at best, before he began flying a modern jet with a high degree of automation, he had accumulated 154 hours of experience.

One of the key factors in that accident was the fact the aircraft remained at takeoff thrust until impact, resulting in high airspeeds that eventually exceed the upper limit and was a significant contributing factor to the accident. The Captain, who was flying, was almost certainly overloaded by the combination of failures and the physical effort required to fly the jet as MCAS trimmed the nose down.

I’m personally convinced that an experienced First Officer would have noted the overspeed and reacted to it. He would have been a partner in that cockpit helping to manage what was happening. He would likely not have become overloaded as seems to have happened with this First Officer. Given that MCAS was a known issue by the time this crash happened, I believe an experienced First Officer would have recognized what was happening and been able to help the Captain work through the issue successfully.

But with only 361 hours, 207 of which were likely on flights where the autopilot was engaged the majority of the time and nothing went wrong, this First Officer lacked the requisite experience and airmanship. That’s not an indictment of either crew member, it’s just the challenge they faced that day was very predictably too much to handle.

It’s something I’ve seen personally once when flying as a regional Captain with a 600-hour former intern First Officer. He was smart as heck and knew his job well. But one day when we had to execute a last-minute unexpected go around it was almost as if his brain shut down. Suddenly, he went from being a model FO to a dead weight occupying a cockpit seat. In that case a little coaxing from me got him back in the game but had it been a serious emergency where my own mental capacity was being challenged, it might have ended differently.

CONCLUSION

1500 hours isn’t a magical number. But it does represent an established level of experience to earn the FAA’s highest license. It also represents enough flying for a pilot to have encountered a multitude of situations that build airmanship. It’s a mark that has been equaled or exceeded by the vast majority of airline pilots in this country before they got their first job and it’s a mark that can easily be achieved through flight instruction. It’s a standard that enhances safety and it’s one that, despite its tortured path into being, is worth supporting.

While other nations use different thresholds, the U.S. chose consistency. The 1500-hour standard forces pilots to gain a broader base of experience before flying passengers, adding a layer of resilience to the system. Do you think the 1500-hour rule provides a reasonable universal benchmark that airlines should not be allowed to bypass in the rush to staff cockpits?